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There are various conflicts between coastal states in the Mediterranean Sea. Some of these 
conflicts are already old, while others have arisen as a result of the process of expanding 
sovereignty over maritime space, due to overlapping jurisdictions and the setting of new 
borders1. In the eastern Mediterranean, it seems that the majority of States respect the following 
jurisprudence; the delimitation agreements between Egypt and Cyprus, between Cyprus and 
Lebanon and between Israel and Cyprus, they all use the equidistance method. These states 
have also submitted notifications to the United Nations regarding their marine areas, which also 
use this method. These notifications do not assume a possible delimitation, but allow for the 
measurement of overlapping claims. Lebanon and Israel filed their notifications in October 
2010 and July 2011, respectively. Both countries use the equidistance method, but do not 
calculate it in the same way; the Lebanese government thus officially protested against one of 
the points in the route of the agreement reached by Cyprus and Israel in 2010, considering that 
it was encroaching on its EEZ. Beirut also disputes the coordinates chosen by Israel to calculate 
equidistance between the two countries from the land border at Ras Naqurah. The result is an 
overlapping area of 860 km2, which remains relatively small. In addition, the gas deposits 
discovered in the area, including Tamar and Leviathan, are located south of this disputed area2. 
Therefore, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an 
extensive, detailed international convention that has formalized and defined many of the main 
norms that relate to legal disputes related to maritime borders, certain coastal states such as 
Israel, Turkey, Syria and Venezuela are not parties; the first three are regionally important 
coastal states in relation to the EMB. Turkey has consistently dismissed the argument that such 
UNCLOS principles have crystallized into normative international law, despite asserting in 
other areas maritime borders representing standards similar to those found in UNCLOS. This 
leaves us with the challenge of having to define the obligations in relation to situations where 
the UNCLOS standards are not applicable or where it is not concluded that the content of the 
UNCLOS standards is expressed in the customary international law3. 
Turkey signed an agreement with Libya on 27 November 2019 delimiting their respective 
maritime borders. The text does not take into account international law or the demands of other 
countries. The two signatories share a gas-rich area and enclave Greek, Cypriot, Israeli, 
                                                           
1 Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero, Eaux territoriales en Méditerranée et en Mer noire, direction générale des politiques 
internes de l'union, Parlement européen, 2009, p. 83. 
2 Didier Ortolland, Droit de la mer et délimitations maritimes en Méditerranée orientale, La Revue de l’Énergie, n° 
610, novembre-décembre, 2012, p. 468. 
3 A. Filis, R. Leal-Arcas, Legal Aspects of Inter-State Maritime Delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, 




Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
 
 
© 2020 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 




Lebanese and Egyptian gas fields. The agreement makes the EastMed pipeline project, which 
is supposed to supply gas from the eastern Mediterranean, extremely fragile. Once the 
agreement is ratified by its parliament, Turkey announces that it will communicate to the UN 
the limits of its new Exclusive Economic zone (EZZ), which would increase by 30%. 
As a response, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement delimiting their maritime borders, 
at a time marked by high tensions with Turkey over the exploitation of natural resources in the 
eastern Mediterranean. This agreement has erected the pillars of regional stability and security 
in the Mediterranean, in accordance with international law that guarantees, to all states, the 
search for natural resources and the exercise of economic activities, but in agreement with 
countries whose coasts are adjacent or facing each other. 
 
1. THE LEGAL STATUS OF MEDITERRANEAN SEA AS A SEMI 
CLOSED SEA  
 
The concept of 'enclosed or semi-enclosed seas' in Article 122 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea is the product of lengthy, often informal negotiations and 
compromises negotiated at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) 4. 
An enclosed or semi-enclosed sea eventually leads to a situation in which the bordering 
States compete for marine space and resources. From a maritime point of view, neighboring 
States can find it difficult to assert a full 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
continental shelf, or even a full 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, without overlapping claims with 
adjacent or opposite states. From a regulatory standpoint, the bordering States share the same 
water body for land-based wastewater discharges and the same marine resource base, both 
living and non-living, for their livelihoods and economic growth. Therefore, States bordering 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas is seen as being geographically disadvantaged States. The 
geographical reality or restriction of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas requires the neighboring 
States to establish "intra-regional" mechanisms to minimize mitigate or eliminate conflicts. The 
process envisaged by the UNCLOS is set out in Article 1235. 
Article 123 recognizes three fields of practice as candidates for cooperation: discovery and 
utilization of living resources, conservation of the aquatic environment and the promotion of 
aquatic scientific research6. Since the mid-1970s, more and more coastal States have decided 
that they have exclusive rights to monitor fishing within 200 m of their coastline. A number of 
countries have opposed this development in international law, but with reflection it is clear that 
this rearguard intervention could only postpone, not avoid, the emergence of this rule. 
UNCLOS III was at work during this decade of the 1982 Convention, and the changes in State 
practice have been codified and evolved into the EEZ regime as set out in Part V. This new 
emphasis on state obligations and, in particular, the introduction of a detailed framework for 
                                                           
4 Budislav Vukas, Maritime Delimitation In A Semi-Enclosed Sea: The Case Of The Adriatic Sea, In, Vaughan 
Lowe, Rainer Lagoni, Daniel Vignes, Maritime Delimitation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 205. 
5 Nien Tsu Alfred Hu, Semi-enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS 
Article 123 to the South China Sea, Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 41, 2010, p. 282. 
6 The three coordination topics are all linked to activities that are likely to have an effect on the interests of more 
than one State bordering the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, if only fisheries migration, environmental water quality 
problems or the mobility of scientifically important structures or phenomena. To the degree that these provisions 
could be applied with regard to scientific study, for example, by means of a regional body, the potential to support 
coastal states and researching institutions, as provided for in Article 248, may be substantial. See, Bernard H. Oxman, 
The Third United Nation's Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, American Journal of 
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the sustainable development of fisheries resources has resulted in a major increase in the role 
of marine resource managers. This has clear consequences for policy-making (i.e. to come up 
with one on topics that have so far been practically unchecked, at least for some states). But 
what if the fisheries policies pursued by a single state are incompatible with those pursued by 
a neighbor, in particular the co-littoral of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea? The results could 
be catastrophic, hence the need for engagement and by no means strictly within the framework 
of Part X of the 1982 Convention7. 
The Mediterranean is the most extensive of the seas that can be described in accordance 
with the challenge set out in Article 122 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea; the two parties are "semi-closed". One third of the world's maritime traffic flows 
through its waters; it also contains about 10% of marine biodiversity, 4% of protected areas and 
1% of the world's waters; it is the most critical meeting and friction point between the north 
and the south of the world, while being a privileged route for migration. Fishing and tourism 
are a livelihood for many coastal communities. Finally, under the waters of the Mediterranean, 
the cradle of Western civilization lies an important cultural heritage, which must be valued8. 
The exceptional nature of the Mediterranean is due not only to the particular vulnerability 
of the marine environment and its resources, but also to the fact that a large part of its basin 
remains subject to the legal regime of the high seas9. 
The two access points of the Mediterranean from the ocean are historical, Inevitable and 
natural: the Strait of Gibraltar and artificial: the Suez Canal. The Strait of Gibraltar is governed 
by the law of transit, which means that any vessel, even warships, has an unobstructed right of 
transit, and submarines can transit through the submerged straits. There is also a right to over 
flight, as shown by the US air bombing of Libya on 15 April 1986. The U.S. planes, coming 
from British bases, overcame the Strait of Gibraltar while their continental partners refused 
them passage through their territories. As well, The Suez Canal, which connects the 
Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, has become an important route for 
maritime transport, removing the circumnavigation of Africa. The importance of the Suez Canal 
could be enhanced with the opening of the North-West Passage, as ships coming from the 
Indian Ocean would cross the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and then reach the 
Pacific Ocean without having to take a longer route through the Panama Canal. The Suez Canal 
regime is governed by the Constantinople Convention of 1888. The canal is open to all shipping 
firms, including merchant ships and warships. Egypt may charge a toll, but cannot close the 
canal, which must be held open during both peacetime and wartime - a stipulation that has often 
been broken for national security considerations10.  
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the unique characteristics of the Mediterranean will then 
emphasize the importance of enhancing cooperation between coastal states. In the study of the 
Mediterranean, careful attention should be paid to Article 123 of the Law of the Sea as it relates 
to cooperation between States bordering the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Cooperation 
between Mediterranean coastal states was, in fact, undertaken well before the adoption of the 
UNCLOS III Law on the Sea. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) created the 
                                                           
7 Clive Schofield, Ian Townsend-Gault, from sundering seas to arenas for cooperation: applying the regime of 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas to the Adriatic, Geoadria, vol 17, no 1, 2012, p. 19. 
8 GemmaAndreone, Giuseppe Cataldi, Regards sur les évolutions du droit de la mer en Méditerranée, Annuaire 
français de droit international, vol. 56, 2010, p. 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10Apart from the two World Wars, during which enemy shipping was closed, the canal was closed to Israeli shipping, 
for example, until the peace settlement between the two countries of March 26, 1979. 
See, Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of the sea and Mediterranean Security, Mediterranean paper, The German Marshall 




Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
 
 
© 2020 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 




Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean in 1949.Specific arrangements for the protection of the 
Mediterranean from pollution have been negotiated in general conventions11, in regional 
treaties12 and in sub-regional agreements13. 
 
2. THE DILEMMA OF THE DELIMITATION OF 
MEDITERRANEAN MARINE AREAS 
 
In the Mediterranean, the problems of delimitation of marine areas are particularly 
complex. This is due to different reasons, which complement each other; the main one, 
however, is the limited extension of the Mediterranean in relation to the number of states that 
are bordering it. These States, as demonstrated by the events of the first half of 2011, also show 
a political sensitivity that is sometimes very strong, which does not fail to provoke many 
incidents, sometimes degenerating into conflict. There is a consequence of the fact that in the 
Mediterranean the south and the north of the world meet and oppose each other. The prospect 
of difficult-to-resolve conflicts has, in the past, been a hindrance to the proclamation in this sea 
of areas of exclusive jurisdiction beyond territorial waters. The delimitation agreements have 
also shown that bilateral delimitation is difficult to escape challenges from third States, which 
are always inevitably very close to the delimited area. As a result, maritime borders are proving 
to be particularly fragile. In addition to these political difficulties, there are also those, more 
technical, which are due to the presence of islands and islets or the conformation of the coasts, 
which are almost always very serrated14. 
Despite these difficulties, the recent proclamations concerning areas beyond the outer limit 
of the territorial sea have changed the legal status of Mediterranean waters. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the delimitation problems that have resulted from this. Areas of exclusive 
jurisdiction proclaimed by coastal States have in common been adopted without consultation 
with other States in the region. They may therefore overlap in some cases. In these areas, 
bilateral agreements on the delimitation of the territorial sea or continental shelf are also in 
force. In addition, agreements on maritime borders, including the delimitation of the respective 
EEZs, have recently been concluded; far from permanently stabilizing the claims in the area 
concerned, they have provoked numerous protests or challenges from third States that are close 
to the area so defined. The result was a series of difficult questions to be resolved, which should 
be briefly considered15. 
In certain cases, the process of defining maritime zones is not perfect either because the 
legislative process is still ongoing in the case , for example, of the State adopting the relevant 
primary legislation but not the requisite subordinate legislation or because the maritime zone 
borders have yet to be consented or adjudicated. 
 
2.1 Some discretion as to the breadth of Territorial Sea up to a maximum 
limit of 12 nm 
 
                                                           
11 For example, the 1954 International Convention for the Protection of the Sea from Oil Pollution. 
12 The 1974 Barcelona Convention and the associated Protocol. 
13 For example, the 1974 Italo-Yugoslav Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection of the Mediterranean; Mazen 
Ali, The application of the law of the sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, Division for ocean Affairs 
and the law of the Sea, Office of legal affairs, United Nations, New York, 2009, pp. 36-37. 
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As the presence of a territorial sea occurs as a result of the operation of the law, it is not 
appropriate for a coastal State to officially claim a territorial sea per se, even though they have 
some control as to its width up to a maximum limit of 12 nm. More precisely, a coastal State 
must determine the width of its territorial sea. In this relation, the majority of States have 
asserted the full entitlement, i.e. 12 nm. For geographical purposes, Greece and Turkey declared 
a territorial sea of just 6 nm. As regards the United Kingdom Sovereign Military Base Areas in 
Cyprus, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, the Treaty of 19 August 1960 on the Creation of the Republic 
of Cyprus specifies in Annex A a marine area between 4 lines with distances ranging from 9.85 
to 7.8 nm and 6.9 to 7.2 nm converging. Nevertheless, these are marine areas surrounding 
military bases and do not constitute sovereign territory. A territorial sea with a range of 3 nm 
has been claimed for Gibraltar. Spain challenges the entitlement of the United 
Kingdom/Gibraltar to a territorial sea or to some other maritime authority16. 
Ultimately, notice can also be made of the Gaza Strip, which has a 40 km coastline. The 
actual legal status of the waters off the Gaza Strip poses complicated and contentious problems 
of international law. Subject to the provisions to the Cairo Agreement of 1994, which was 
eventually incorporated into the Interim Agreement17, it was decided that Israel would have 
complete control and sole security authority over the territorial waters nearby to the Gaza Strip, 
while at the same time the Gaza Strip would have a 20 nm fishing and activity zone. The Israeli 
Navy has been operating an exclusion zone within these waters since 3 January 2009 on the 
basis of customary international law particularly in relation to naval warfare instead of 
UNCLOS18. 
 
2.2 The complicated process of analyzing the current situation with 
regard to the establishment of EEZs and Continental shelf 
 
In the Montego Bay Convention, the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
between States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent is covered by Article 74, the content of 
which is identical to that of Article 83, which concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
Both provisions, incorporating the indications given by the International Court of Justice in its 
decision of 20 February 1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, call for the "fair solution" 
criterion19. Therefore, the 1982 Convention does not contain any substantive standard on 
maritime delimitation between contiguous or facing States; it is merely formulating procedural 
                                                           
16 European Commission, DG MARE, Costs and benefits arising from the establishment of maritime zones in the 
Mediterranean Sea, Final Report, MARE/2010/05, June 2013, pp. 45-46.  
17 In 1994, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Region, which established the conditions for the parties to exercise their authority and led to the actual 
withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The 1994 agreement was superseded by another in 1995, the 
Temporary Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which called for Israeli withdrawal from all major 
West Bank cities, with the exception of Hebron, where Israel would withdraw from most areas but would maintain 
troops to defend several hundred Israelis who had settled in the center of the Gaza Strip. See, John Quigley, The 
Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties, Cornell International L aw Journal, vol. 30, no 3, p.720. For 
more details, See, Peter Malanczu, Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the 
Perspective of International Law, European Journal of International Law, vol 7, no 4, 1996, pp. 286-288. 
18 European Commission, DG MARE, op.cit, pp. 45-46. 
19 In this regards the ICJ emphasis that : "the position is simply that in certain cases -not a great number- the States 
concerned agreed to draw or did draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance. There is 
no evidence that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of 
customary law obliging them to do so-especially considering that they might have been motivated by other obvious 
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obligations. A creative and decisive role has been played by international jurisprudence, which 
has treated areas other than the EEZ itself in the same way20. 
In fact, the mechanism of assessing the current situation with respect to the designation of 
EEZs in the Mediterranean is hindered by the processes under which maritime zones are 
asserted. The first stage is usually the approval by the coastal State of legislation which 
provides, inter alia, for the creation of an EEZ. A large proportion of coastal states in the 
Mediterranean have such legislation in effect. In the case of Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Slovenia, Syria and Tunisia, it is stipulated 
that such legislation can only be a prerequisite to the creation of an EEZ in the Mediterranean, 
provided that these countries do not have access to any other sea. In the context that some 
countries have non-Mediterranean coastlines, France, Morocco and Spain have legislation in 
place which provides for the creation of EEZs; even though not all of these countries have 
sought to create complete EEZs in the Mediterranean. For example, France has set in place the 
necessary legislation to create a complete EEZ in the Mediterranean Sea and announced its 
intention to set up an EEZ in the Mediterranean Sea in August 2009 and officially to the UN in 
August 201021.  
Egypt can also be shown in the group of country, i.e. with both the Mediterranean and non-
Mediterranean coasts. By ratification of the UNCLOS on 26 August 1983, Egypt confirmed 
that it "will pursue, from this date onwards, the rights attributed to it by the provisions of 
Sections V and VI of the UNCLOS in the EEZ situated beyond and adjacent to its territorial 
sea in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea" and that it "will undertake to define the external 
limits of its EEZ in accordance with the rules, requirements and modalities laid down by the 
UNCLOS22.  
In 1981, Morocco proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ that in principle applies indiscriminately to 
the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Morocco. This area replaced the 
70-mile exclusive fishing area established by the Moroccan Government in 1973. Morocco has 
not yet asserted its rights to delimit EEZ over the waters of the Mediterranean. Morocco has 
not yet entered into negotiations with neighboring countries to delineate the extension of its 
EEZ in the Mediterranean. However, Morocco wields typical EEZ powers over Spain beyond 
12 miles of territorial waters and in the Alboran Sea23. 
                                                           
20 The ICJ in the case concerning the Gulf of Maine asserted " the principle of international law - that delimitation 
must be effected by agreement - which, as the Chamber has noted , is expressed in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention, 
and additionally, it may be thought, the implicit rule it enshrines, are principles already clearly affirmed by customary 
international law, principles which, for that reason, are undoubtedly of general application, valid for all States and 
in relation to all kinds of maritime delimitation". ICJ case concerning the Gulf of Main, Judgment of 12 October 
1984, para 90, pp.292-293. 
21 Loi no. 76-665 relative à la zone économique au large des côtes du territoire de la République, JO du 16 juillet 
1976. It is worth mentioning "France established in 2003 a ‘ecological protection area’ applicable in both the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean waters, as a declination of its already existing EEZ in the Atlantic waters. In that zone, France 
would exercise domestic laws and regulations and ‘in addition, the competences recognized by international law 
relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment’, including over ‘foreign ships even registered 
in a territory of a government not party to the MARPOL Convention’. Loi no. 2003-346 du 15 avril 2003 relative à 
la création d’une zone de protection écologique au large des côtes du territoire de la République, JO du 16 avril 
2003, modifiant Loi no. 76-665. See, Maria Gavouneli, State Jurisdiction in Protection of the Marine Environment, 
in, David Josef Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Norman A Martinez Gutirrez, Riyaz Hamza, The IMLI Manual of 
International Law, Volume III: Marine Environmental Law and Maritime Security Law, Oxford University Press, 
2016, p.23. See also, Maria Gavouneli, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol 23, 2008, p. 490. 
22 Claudiane Chevalier, Governance of the Mediterranean Sea: Outlook for the Legal Regime, Centre for 
Mediterranean Cooperation, IUCN - Global Marine Programme, 2005, p. 44. 
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The Croatian maritime code, adopted on 27 January 1994, contains several provisions 
relating to the EEZ. Nevertheless, the application of these provisions is subject to the decision 
of the Croatian Parliament to proclaim this type of zone. The Croatian Republic has taken steps 
to establish an ecological protection and fishing zone24. 
According to article 4 of law 2005-50 of June 27, 200518, Tunisia has established an EEZ. 
However, the question of its width has not yet been decided. At most it will be 200 miles long, 
and the limits will also be determined by agreement with neighboring States. Tunisia reserves 
the right, within this EEZ, to create areas of more restricted jurisdiction by regulation (reserved 
fishing areas, fishing protection zones or ecological protection zones25. 
As seen with the territorial sea, the rights of the coastal State over its continental shelf 
derive from the application of the constitution. However, in order to control the activities taking 
place on its continental shelf, the coastal State would typically have to follow national 
legislation on the continental shelf26. 
We should point out that the delimitation line remains linked to the time when it was fixed. 
Because any delimitation is a unicum, a line is necessarily the result of the circumstances that 
led to its fixing, which may change over time. It is therefore not possible to separate the 
provisions governing these boundaries from the circumstances which gave rise to them. The 
attachment of a delimitation line must be contextual for all spaces to be delimited. The principle 
should be recalled because it had occurred more than once that, in the unilaterally declared 
areas of the Mediterranean, an attempt had been made to coincide the outer limit of an area with 
the line set by an earlier agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf, without the prior 
agreement of the other State27.  
It is certainly not undeniable that it may in principle be appropriate to delimit different 
marine areas, such as the territorial sea, continental shelf, EEZ, etc., using a single line. 
However, this applies only in cases where the delimitation adopted by means of a single line is 
contextual for all the areas or interests to be delimited, or, if it is not, provided that the State 
which, in the past, it had been obligated about only one of the areas at stake, for example the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, had explicitly indicated its agreement. As with any other 
delimitation hypothesis, the choice of a single line remains subject to the general principle of a 
fair solution. There are various examples of the use in the Mediterranean of an all purpose limit 
adopted by common agreement and context, such as “the 1984 agreement between France and 
                                                           
24 Ibid, p. 758. 
25 Ibid, p.759. 
26 Ibid. 
27This was the case when Croatia unilaterally crossed the provisional limit of its fishing and ecological protection 
zone by adopting the line agreed between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1968 for the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
On 8 January 1968, Italy and Yugoslavia signed an agreement to delimit their continental shelf in the Adriatic, which 
came into force on 21 January 1970. The agreement is also the first continental shelf boundary to be reached and 
enforced in the Mediterranean. The border extended for 353 nautical miles, consisting of 42 segments connecting to 
43 turning points – 40 segments are straight and two curved. The extension of the maritime boundary to the Gulf of 
Trieste persisted at a later date, as there was still some dispute at the time of the negotiations on the final status of 
the land boundary between the parties in the region. Point 01 of the 1968 agreement is thus 12 nm from the nearest 
shore. Subsequently, an Italian Yugoslav agreement on territorial waters was reached in 1975. At the south-eastern 
extremity of the border line, the parties decided not to extend the boundary south of Point 43, thus falling short of 
the tripoint of Italy Yugoslavia-Albania. See, Gerald H. Blake and Duko Topalovi, The Maritime Boundaries of the 
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Monaco28, The agreement between Albania and Greece on 27 April 2009, which was later 
annulled by the Albanian constitutional Court”29 30. 
 
3. THE PROBLEMATIC OF MARITIME BOUNDARY IN THE 
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
 
Current tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have brought several drivers, including a 
race to tap energy resources, long-standing maritime conflicts and wider geopolitical rivalry 
between regional powers. Although Turkey's recent assertiveness of its rights in the Eastern 
Mediterranean has drawn renewed attention to the region, this round of conflict has been going 
on for a long time. Greece's ambition to claim EEZ for its islands up to 12 nautical miles on the 
basis of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which would effectively 
turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek bay, is a driving factor of current tensions. Turkey is not a 
signatory to this convention and has long called such a situation a cause of war. Moreover, the 
lack of resolution of the Cyprus issue aggravated by the entry of the European Union to the 
island complicates maritime conflicts between the two neighbors, who are both NATO allies. 
These underlying problems between Greece and Turkey are now becoming increasingly 
complicated by gas offshore drilling and wider geopolitical rivalry in the region. It is hoped 
that the threat of confrontation will subside as the two sides seek to alleviate tensions. However, 
it is far from clear whether a permanent solution can be accomplished without resolving the 
Cyprus problem in the face of the EU's incompetent assistance for the Greek side and its threat 
of sanctions against Turkey31. 
 
                                                           
28 In 1984, France delimited its territorial sea and continental shelf with Monaco, where it was the boundary line for 
the shelf with Monaco, where it was also decided that the boundary line for the shelf would also apply in the case of 
a potential proclamation of the EZZ or equivalent region of jurisdiction. This was the first Mediterranean 
demarcation agreement concerning a common maritime border for all areas of authority, both future and current, 
and the Principality of Monaco is the only State in the Mediterranean to have fully settled all its maritime 
demarcation with its neighbouring States. See, Mitja Grbec, The Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Enclosed 
or Semi-Enclosed Seas: Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective, Routledge, 2014, p. 71. Norman A. Martínez 
Gutiérrez, Serving the Rule of International Maritime Law: Essays in Honour of David Joseph Attard, Routledge, 
2010. 
29 On 19 March 2009, the talks in Tirana ended and the "Agreement between Greece and Albania on the delimitation 
of the continental shelf and other maritime areas belonging to the International Law" was initialled. This Agreement 
was signed in Tirana by the two respective Foreign Ministers on 27 April 2009. After its adoption, the Agreement 
specifies that "the maritime boundaries between Albania and Greece shall be defined on the basis of the equities 
expressed by the medium line." The merits of the case will include the review of the full file of the agreement, along 
with text of the agreement in three languages: English, Greek and English, as well as the maps of the agreement 
which have not yet been made public. Stress that Albania ratified the UNCLOS on 23 June 2003, while Greece 
ratified it on 21 July 1995. The agreement was approved by the Albanian Parliament, but the Albanian Constitutional 
Court did not accept it, claiming that it was in conflict with the Constitution of Albania and the United Nations Third 
Convention of the International Law of the Sea of 1982. The Court notes that " in the draught agreement in question, 
there is a procedural and substantive violation which is incompatible with the Constitution and the Convention of 
the Third United Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.' From a legal point of view, it is 
important that the Court is not satisfied with the focus on procedural infringements, and that this power lacks 
omnipotence and bypasses the position of President of the Republic, a violation which in itself constitutes a violation 
of the Constitution. Instead, the Court based its decision on a breach of the public of international law". See, Kasëm 
Cena, Albania - Greece Agreement on Setting Maritime Boundaries, According to International Law, Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol 4, no 3, 2015, pp. 143, 147.  
30 Gemma Andreone, Giuseppe Cataldi, op.cit, pp. 16-17. 
31 Kadir Ustun, Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Disputes and Geopolitical Competition, Washington 
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3.1  Claims over Gas Resources and the exploitation of energy as reason 
of disputes  
 
The first Eastern Mediterranean gas champ, Abu Madi, has been discovered more than 50 
years ago. The Nile Delta in Egypt was found on shore in 1967. The Abu Qir gas field was 
found in the Mediterranean Sea offshore Egypt in 1969. In 2003, Egypt became a gas exporter 
after numerous other discoveries since then. Due to country political stability, there have been 
no bidding rounds between 2011 and 2013 on hydrocarbon exploration, and in April 2015 
Egypt became a net importer of gas. Following 2013, Egypt initiated several tender rounds and 
signed over 100 gas exploration and production concession agreements. There have been many 
discoveries about successful bidding rounds and pricing policy amendments. Of these, the most 
significant is the exploration of the Zohr field, estimated at 651,4 to 736,3bcm in August 2015. 
This, the largest gas exploration ever made in Egypt and in the Mediterranean Sea, is regarded 
as the major opportunity for gas exploration in Egypt and the region as a whole. Several 
negotiating rounds, encompassing onshore and offshore Egypt, are slated to launch in the 
coming years32. 
The Egyptian government's desire to turn the country into the region's true energy hub is 
evident, despite its rivals for this position by other major actors, particularly Turkey. This vision 
is also focused on the existence in the country of impressive energy infrastructures. The possible 
ability to use Idku and Damietta 's existing liquefaction plants on the Egyptian coast, and two 
existing gas pipelines from Egypt to Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – none of which are 
actually used – is highly important. The potential is yet to be checked. This development could 
allow Egypt to break its Saudi Arabia dependence and the Gulf monarchies, which today are 
the Egyptian regime's most powerful political and financial backers, thus guaranteeing new 
space for manoeuvre within its international relations33. 
It is worth noting that Egypt, as the biggest and not only metaphorically most important 
Arab country, is a further regional power with an evidently decade of experience in energy 
security. Over the last few years, Egypt has progressed from an energy exporter to an energy 
importer. At present, Egypt has a clear interest in the import of Cypriot gas and has already 
concluded agreements to that extent with the island republic. In the light of the ongoing political 
"cold war" with Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece concluded multiple partnership agreements 
at the Cairo summit at the end of 2014, marking the start of a close relationship34. 
In 2007, 2012, and 2016 the Republic of Cyprus organized offshore rallies for discovery of 
hydrocarbons and awarded 9 blocks to the foreign companies for oil. The five blocks that 
Turkey claims to fall partially within its continental shelf, although bids have been obtained for 
some of the blocs, are noticeably not on the list of active biders during the first two rounds. 
Block 7 was awarded to the consortium in September 2019, also challenged by Turkey. The 
discovery of the Aphrodite offshore gas field by Noble Energy in December 2011 was 
celebrated as the solid investment for gas exploration in Cyprus. But, due mainly to the lack of 
on-site gas facilities, the lack of a unification deal with Israel and the delays to gain official 
approval of the field construction plans, it hasn't yet been built. Total and Eni find the Calypso 
                                                           
32 Ana Stanič, Sohbet Karbuz, The challenges facing Eastern Mediterranean gas and how international law can help 
overcome them, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 2020, p. 2. 
33 Janiki Cingoli, The New Energy Resources in the Centre-East Mediterranean: Potential Current and Future Geo-
Strategic Consequences, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2016, p. 5. 
34 Angelos Giannakopoulos, Introduction, in, Angelos Giannakopoulos (edits), Energy Cooperation and Security in 
the Eastern Mediterranean: A Seismic Shift towards Peace or Conflict? The S. Daniel Abraham Center for 




Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
 
 
© 2020 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 




gas field in 2018. On-site natural gas deposits of approximately 142–227bcm were discovered 
by ExxonMobil in Glaucus in February 201935. 
Furthermore, the problem of Cyprus has always been an important international issue which 
affects and is also affected by political developments in the eastern Mediterranean. The 
discovery, in the East and Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus, of hydrocarbon 
reserves and efforts in hydrocarbon exploration have altered the geopolitics of the region, which 
have placed at risk the equilibrium of power along with any future developments in the Cyprus 
crisis. In addition, the talks between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots for a feasible 
solution continue underway considering the lengthy times during which they are disrupted. In 
addition, the talks are deeply influenced by the interventionist position and special interests of 
the other states in the area36. 
Greece is another country that has historically been interested in rivalry in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and in the process of addressing the Cyprus issue due to its historical and ethnic 
relations with Cyprus. However, due to its financial difficulties over the last decade, the impact 
of Greece has been somewhat reduced. It is clear that Greece's economic difficulties, along with 
its long-established strategic place of absence from the Cyprus issue negotiations'; do not enable 
Greece to play an active role in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. This deprives Greece of 
future strategic advantages in Cyprus, especially in the sense of Greek-Turkish rivalry and the 
extraction of hydrocarbons. At the same time, Greece has no clear good technical strategy for 
the extraction of hydrocarbons that may potentially be contained in the Greek EEZ. However, 
Greece is trying to improve its relations with Cyprus and Israel in an effort to establish a new 
political structure for stability and defense and energy problems with neighboring countries. 
Greek strategy includes joint military drills with both Cyprus and Israel, and most likely with 
Egypt in the future, in order to strengthen its diplomatic and geopolitical position in the region 
amid its economic problems. In addition, Greece is continuing to conclude agreements with 
other countries in the region, such as Israel, Egypt and RoC, for the transport of energy from 
the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe through pipelines, such as the EastMed event. The goal 
of Greece is to encourage energy-related issues in order to improve potential hydrocarbon 
extraction efforts in the Greek EEZ37. 
As well, Greece imports its natural resources by pipeline by Turkey or LNG tankers from 
African countries. The country's reliance on Turkish pipelines further limits its reaction to the 
continuing dispute with Turkey. However, recent geological studies have shown a high 
potential for gas discovery in the Greek EEZ. The current economic crisis in Greece has further 
underscored the value of energy self-sufficiency and as a source of income. Thus, in recent 
years, the Greek Government has tendered and received tenders for offshore drilling in its 
Mediterranean EEZ38. 
The energy situation in Turkey is radically different. Although acting as a transition point 
for pipelines flowing from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe, the country lacks significant 
energy supplies of its own, save for the small off-shore gas field in the Black Sea, and has 
historically been a major importer of energy resources. In an attempt to benefit from offshore 
gas discoveries in the area, Turkey has recently launched new exploration operations in the 
                                                           
35 Ana Stanič, Sohbet Karbuz, The challenges facing Eastern Mediterranean gas, op.cit, pp. 3-4. 
36 Evaghoras L. Evaghorou, Energy developments in the eastern Mediterranean region and geostrategic implications 
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37 Ibid, p. 114. 
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Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In a strategically controversial decision, Turkey has recently 
launched discoveries on behalf of Northern Cyprus in the Cypriot EEZ39. 
Ankara has been occupying Northern Cyprus since 1974 and is the only member of the 
international community to have recognized the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." 
Turkey also refuses the Cyprus Government, recognized by the international community, the 
ability to exercise sovereignty or authority over the maritime areas of the island as a whole 
before the Cyprus dispute has been settled. Ankara has thus denounced all the agreements of 
delimitation signed by Cyprus with other countries to determine its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) which, however, concern only the southern part of the island controlled by the 
Government of Nicosia40. 
In the Eastern Mediterranean battles pace, the promise of development through the 
commercialization of hydrocarbon exploration has conflicting consequences for competing 
territorial claims. Overall, the economic prospects for extraction of natural resources have 
adversely affected main U.S. strategic, regional, political and military allies: Israel, the 
Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Turkey. The RoC and Israel have arisen as sources of coal. Their 
recently discovered gas offers tremendous sovereign wealth, providing both a cost-effective 
energy supply for their import-dependent energy economies and a future high-value source of 
revenues from gas exports to and outside the country. Turkey rejects the rights of the Greek 
Cypriots of the RoC to use these natural resources without the consent of the Turk-Cypriots 
and sees it as their duty to defend the rights and interests of the Turk-Cypriots by assisting the 
self-declared TRNC in both economic and military terms. Escorting the language of defending 
people's rights and national interests is alleged coercive military extension of intimidation by 
the use of naval powers in the area. Turkey's assertiveness, seen as a power politics in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, stands out as obvious hegemonic aspirations rife with increasing 
conflict. Unless diplomatic solutions are sought to address the different perceptions of the 
demarcation of the maritime region, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea can broaden and 
expand. The ramifications of the EEZ claims need to be worked out in line with international 
maritime law. If a 'mutual Maritime Development Framework,' modeled after the Arctic 
Council, is not formed to settle disputes maritime border disputes, all tensions now have the 
capacity to intensify into another Persian Gulf Crisis41. 
 
3.2. The Greece-Egypt Maritime agreement 
 
On 7 August 2020, Greece and Egypt reached an agreement on the delimitation of the 
maritime borders of the two countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The two States have 
concluded an outstanding agreement which reconfirms and enshrines the effect and right of 
islands to a continental shelf and an EZE in compliance with international law and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This agreement helps both countries to 
make progress in optimizing the use of resources available in the exclusive economic zone , 
especially promising oil and gas reserves. 
 
3.2.1. The context 
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The roots of the Delimitation Agreement between Greece and Egypt date back to the onset 
of looking up energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean in the early 2000s. Proceeding 
with the discovery and ultimate extraction of offshore energy resources, it was important to 
decide the maritime borders of coastal states: Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, 
Syria and Turkey. Cyprus and Egypt were among the first to sign an agreement on the 
delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone in 2003. The arrangement is founded on 'a median 
line each of which is equidistant from the closest point on the basis of the two Parties.' Cyprus 
then signed two new deals on the basis of median / equivalent lines with Lebanon in 2007 (not 
currently in effect here) and with Israel in 2010. All three documents are succinct and each 
contains five articles42. 
Greece and Egypt began discussing the delimitation of their borders in 2005. There were 
two ways for delimitation: resolved and peacefully-agreed on a border basis and, if agreements 
failed, recourse to third party dispute resolution or arbitration. Negotiations were lengthy and 
undertaken in good faith, but the geographical features of Greece and the involvement of third 
parties, such as Turkey, posed legal and political difficulties in the delimitation region. Egypt 
was seeking not to participate with the Greek-Turkish dispute43. 
On 8 November 2014, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt interacted for the first time in Cairo. At 
the conclusion of the trilateral meeting, the three States signed the Cairo Declaration, 
inaugurating a new period of partnership and cooperation. Starting with the problem that 
enhanced the position of each State that of hydrocarbons, it was understood that the discovery 
of significant hydrocarbon reserves would serve as a mechanism for regional cooperation by 
obedience to well-established principles of international law. In this respect, the uniform 
existence of the UNCLOS has been supported, with all three parties promising to discuss the 
delimitation of their maritime zones,' where this has not yet been achieved. In addition, the 
declaration emphasized the importance of upholding the territorial rights and sovereignty of 
Cyprus over its EEZ, calling on Turkey to avoid once and for all from seismic survey operations 
and related practices within Cyprus's maritime zones. Care has also been paid to the Cyprus 
crisis, where the need for a fair, inclusive and permanent settlement to reunify the island in line 
with international law, as well as the applicable Security Council resolutions, has been 
emphasized. In this regard, the President of the Cyprus referred to a solution leading to a bi-
zonal, bi-communal union with a single and special legal personality and nationality, while 
clarifying that the rapprochement between the three states 'is not directed towards any 
government. As a result, it has enabled all regional players who share the values of international 
law with a view to fostering stability, development and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
become members of strengthening cooperation44. 
Just around a year after the first trilateral meeting, the three parties convened again in 
Nicosia on 29 April 2015. The "hydrocarbon problem" remained at the heart of the cooperation 
with UNCLOS to be established as the required means by which such cooperation could grow. 
The imperative for a just, comprehensive and permanent solution to the Cyprus crisis" under 
                                                           
42 Art.1 defines the precise position of the median boundary; Art.2 deals with transboundary seabed resources; Art.3 
governs the mechanism of potential demarcation with third States; Art.4 deals with conflict settlement; and Art.5 
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international law and the Related Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council" was also 
echoed.Likewise, trilateral convergence did not take long to take on a wider dimension; 
understanding that tourism and the maritime industry have a crucial role to play in the 
economies of all three nations, and following in the footsteps of the former Tripartite 
Memorandum on Tourism Cooperation between Cyprus , Greece and Egypt, all the actors 
agreed to intensify their maritime cooperation45. 
The 3rd Trilateral Summit, which took place in Athens on 10 December 2015, acquired an 
even more geopolitical aspect. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt accepted the possibility of deeper 
collaboration generated by the discovery of the large "Zohr" natural gas field and affirmed their 
contribution to the delineation of contiguous maritime zones according to the UNCLOS. They 
also welcomed the continuing diplomatic process under the UN Good Office Mission for a just, 
permanent and substantive resolution of the Cyprus crisis. In addition, in addition to the 
political aspect of the partnership, the formation of a Joint Cooperation Committee was decided 
to develop, develop and encourage practical projects of trilateral importance. Relation was also 
made to the 20th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration; the EU proposal introduced at the 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27 November 1995 and laid the groundwork for the Euro-
Mediterranean Relationship46. 
Focusing on Euromed and United for Mediterranean, the three States held the 4th Trilateral 
Summit in Cairo on 11 October 2016. The key axis of cooperation that of oil encountered an 
improvement to the EU components, which called for sustainability of energy supplies and 
paths, protection of energy supply and creation of new energy infrastructures. The regional 
energy capacity was crucial to the EU's ambitions, whilst the three countries, acknowledging 
their relevance to the EU, decided to strengthen energy cooperation. In addition, it was repeated 
that all new explorations and transport solutions that will act as a channel for regional peace 
and development would be focused on well-established concepts of international law, such as 
the UNCLOS. Similarly, any remaining problems pertaining to the demarcation of contiguous 
maritime areas should be governed respectively47. 
It is worth noting that, Egypt has practiced mutual energy diplomacy with a view to make 
full use of the total East Med energy capital. These efforts have been successful and have 
contributed to strong relations with Cyprus and Greece, as expressed in the various tripartite 
summits, official high-level visits and multiple partnership agreements. Cooperation was 
encouraged by the fact that Shell is both the director of the Idku facility and co-owner of the 
Aphrodite field.In November 2017, Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades, Egyptian President 
Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras formally endorsed the proposal, 
and in September 2018, the press reported that Cairo and Nicosia had signed an agreement on 
the development of an underwater pipeline to export natural gas to Egypt under the terms of a 
trade agreement to be negotiated at a later date. The deal would necessarily have to be accepted 
by the European Union48.A range of Memoranda of Understanding in the domains of education, 
industry and small and medium-sized companies, customs and border technology and 
investment promotion have also been signed. Once again, the Trilateral Summit reiterated 
Cyprus's territorial rights over its EEZ under the UNCLOS and called on Turkey to halt all 
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illicit activity in the Cyprus maritime region and to refrain from such acts in the future. At the 
end of the day, these changes were by no means targeted at or excluded any third country49. 
 
3.2.2. The main aspects of the agreement 
 
This agreement helps both countries to make progress in optimizing the use of appropriate 
resources in the exclusive economic zone, particularly potential oil and gas reserves50. 
The Preamble to the Agreement between Greece and Egypt acknowledges the importance 
and potential applications of the UN Charter and the UNCLOS. It applies explicitly to the ideals 
of good neighborliness, harmony and good faith. The Preamble stresses that each party shall 
assert its sovereign rights and authority in compliance with the UNCLOS of which both Greece 
and Egypt are parties. UNCLOS specifies that an arrangement on the basis of international law 
between the States involved is the main mechanism for the delimitation of maritime borders, 
along with the EEZ and the continental shelf. UNCLOS does not define a procedure for 
evaluating the limit, but rather that the boundary comes to a equitable solution. A openly agreed 
and approved demarcation convention based on consensus, as specified in Articles 74(1) and 
83(1) of the UNCLOS, complies with international law. Moreover, the agreement does not 
apply to the Continental Shelf system. This is presumably how the parties recognized that the 
EEZ encompassed territorial privileges and sovereignty in the continental shelf. Although two 
different areas exist, the EEZ and the continental shelf within 200 nautical miles have common 
boundaries and substantive privileges. Thus, international jurisprudence suggests a trend 
towards a single border for both the EEZ and the continental shelf within 200 nm51. 
As well, the accepted boundary is a fairly straight-line delimitation of opposite EEZs based 
on the median line. The design is reduced to just 5 points between the 26th and 28th meridians. 
It is necessary to specify the geographical coverage of implementation of the UNCLOS duty 
not to endanger or hamper the reaching of the final agreement 'and relevant obligations of 
control under customary international law52. 
The agreement confirms that the Greek islands have been considered within the boundaries 
of the sea. The border on the Greek side was focused entirely on the coast of the islands. This 
is seen by the points at which the border was drawn along Crete and partly from Rhodes. 
According to the long-standing position of Greece: since the islands create maritime areas of 
their own, even though they are closely interconnected and form communities that reflect 
spatial unity, it follows that the islands can be taken as the basis for the maritime border, which 
is the median line between the Greek islands and the opposite mainland shore. Greece presumes 
only that certain low-rise elevations and other uninhabitable insular features can be overlooked 
in the demarcation process. However in the Greek-Egypt agreement, the boundary is not a strict 
median line, which is the core situation of Greece, but a modified median53. 
 
3.2.3. The Egyptian vision: An agreement in accordance with of international law 
 
The exploration of natural resources within Egypt's territorial waters of the Mediterranean 
Sea, such as the greatest field in the region, has motivated Egypt to aim to ever become a central 
gas hub. This has included, for example, opening up the economy of the country to foreign 
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investment in this area. Regional uncertainty, compounded by tensions over territorial waters 
between Eastern Mediterranean countries, is a major obstacle to Egypt's gains from the 
expansion of gas trade. Turkey, which is not a member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Group, concluded a Delimitation Agreement with the Libyan Government in 2019 to guarantee 
accessibility to resources found in the Mediterranean Sea. This Agreement was deemed 
illegitimate under international law of the sea and denounced not only by Egypt, but also by 
Greece, Cyprus and the European Union. Otherwise, the agreement was a legal response to the 
Turkish-Libyan agreement, given the scope of recent Turkish exploratory drilling in the area of 
the Greek island of Kastelorizo54. 
The Greek-Egyptian delimitation of maritime areas determines the extent of the arguments 
of those two States which are in dispute with the Turkish allegations. At the same time, 
following the agreement signed with Cyprus in 2003, the agreement between Egypt and a 
member of the European Union is intended to improve the authority of Egyptian policy in the 
Mediterranean. The purpose of the agreement was to increase profits from the resource 
extraction. The agreement was also followed by stronger collaboration between Egypt and 
Greece in other sectors expected to further promote relations between them55. 
Liquefying and transferring gas supplied from Israel and Cyprus to European lands by 
Greece. Egypt reached an agreement with Israel early last year—between the private Egyptian 
corporation Dolphinus Holdings on the one side and the two companies: Delek Exploration and 
its U.S. partner Noble Energy on the other hand—to sell an estimated $15 billion of natural gas 
from both fields: Tamar and Leviathan. Then in October 2019, the gas agreement was amended 
to raise the volume exported to Egypt from 32 billion cubic meters as set out in the initial 
agreement to 60 billion cubic meters of gas over 15 years. Egypt also signed an agreement with 
Cyprus on 19 September last year in Nicosia to construct a gas pipeline between the two 
countries to deliver Cypriot gas to Egyptian liquefied natural gas stations. In particular, the 
development of its energy exchange schemes would be of no particular benefit if it were not 
integrated with Europe by Greece. Egypt has signed an approximate €2-billion power 
interconnection agreement with Cyprus - from which to Greece - through cable with a capacity 
of 3000 megawatts per hour. These capacities are rising as the number of cables, as well as 
Egypt's growing power generation capacity, rises. In addition, Egypt is moving on an electrical 
link with Saudi Arabia via cable with a capacity of up to 3000 megawatts; although it has 
already begun an electrical connection with Sudan with a capacity of 70 megawatts per hour, 
and with Jordan via an electrical cable with a capacity of up to 550 megawatts per hour. In 
2018, Egypt sold a total of 188 gigawatts to Jordan via this cable56. 
For Greece, the Turkish Maritime Boundary Demarcation Agreement with the Government 
of the National Agreement (GNA) primarily accrues from the Greek EEZ. In other words, the 
first benefit of Greece's demarcation of its maritime boundaries with Egypt is the provision of 
a legal system governing its unspecified land zones in the Eastern Mediterranean region over 
the coming decades, thus restricting the outcomes of the agreements. And so on having 
provided Greece with legal reasoning, along with the International Law of the Sea, in the 
context of an international agreement that opposes the Turkish-Libyan agreement, enhances 
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Greece's status by retaining its EEZ before international organizations and the international 
society generally. Otherwise, the Greece-Egypt Maritime agreement causes Turkey to lose the 
chance to delimit its coastal borders with Egypt. Over the last time, Turkey has continuously 
followed this delimitation by giving a greater EEZ than the potential outcome of the 
delimitation of borders with Greece. However in accordance with the laws of international law 
in general and the Law of the Sea in particular, Egypt rejected this bid57. 
 
3.3.  Bilateral Agreement: Turkey and Libya 
 
On November 27, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the head of the 
Libyan National Unity Government Fayez al-Sarraj concluded an agreement to delimit their 
maritime areas, which allows Turkey to assert rights over large areas in the eastern 
Mediterranean, as well as an agreement on "military and security cooperation". This latter 
allows Turkey to strengthen his armed support to the GNA. But it is above all the agreement 




Turkey has not signed or ratified the UNCLOS. Act No 2674 of 20 May 1982 lays down 
the expansion of its territorial sea at a maximum of 6 nautical miles58 and instructs the Council 
of Ministers to set a cap of more than 6 nautical miles for the territorial sea, according to the 
reservation that it takes into account all the unique conditions and related cases therein, in a 
manner consistent with the theory of justice. At present, Turkey is enforcing the 6-mile rule in 
the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea maximum is 12 nautical miles. Turkey does not have 
any regulations relating to its continental shelf or EEZ. Decree No 86/11264 of 17 December 
1986 of the Council of Ministers created the Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black 
Sea at 200 nautical miles, but "no proclamation of the EEZ has been made for the 
Mediterranean59". However as regards its continental shelf, in 2011 Turkey signed a 
demarcation agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus surrounding part of its 
continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean60. 
The maritime sovereignty conflicts that have been going on in the Eastern Mediterranean 
for about 10 years have intensified significantly with the latest actions of Greek Cypriot State 
(GCA) and Greece. These efforts are funded by multinational players such as the European 
Union, the United States, Russia, France and regional States such as Israel and Egypt. EastMed 
pipeline project and Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum; Exclusive Economic Zone agreements 
signed by GCA with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel; GCA's unilaterally in its announced EEZ 
authorizing and discovery efforts have forced Turkey to make a tactical decision61.  
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58 Art. 1 of Act No 2674 of 20 May 1982states: ʺThe sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey extends beyond its land 
territory to its territorial sea. The breadth of the territorial sea shall be of six nautical miles. The Council of Ministers 
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Turkey has negotiated this Agreement with the Government of the National Agreement. 
Forty-two years of Qaddafi’s reign in Libya have been overthrown by Arab Spring protests and 
NATO interference with the support of the UN. A dual-governed Libya appeared as a result of 
the country's elections, and Libya has not been able to resolve the civil war since 2011. Briefly, 
Libya has been living in turmoil with a civil war climate with little political order since 2011. 
This is a very critical situation for the stability of the agreement between Turkey and Libya62. 
The principle purpose for the Turkey-Libya Agreement is the conflict between Turkey, 
Northern Cyprus and Greek Cypriot State on maritime sovereignty in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. There are 122 tones of natural gas and 1,7 billion bbls in the Levant Basin. As 
a result of this situation, the offshore drilling operations in the region have created tension. The 
reason for this disagreement is the Cyprus issue and the controversy in the Aegean. The major 
dispute that Turkey is facing with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean is the delimitation of 
territorial waters and the continental shelf, and even the Cyprus dispute63. 
As part of the exchange of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean, the question of 
identifying maritime sovereignty areas has been an important agenda topic in recent years. The 
value of energy supplies is growing in line with the rise in global energy production and use. 
Oil and gas are both economically and politically relevant. Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon 
resources are of considerable importance for the economies and political influence of the 
regional countries. In this background, Turkey has signed a significant agreement with Libya 
to make use of energy resources in the region, to secure the borders of Mavi Vatan, the rights 
and privileges of itself and of the TRNC, and to engage in national and regional energy 
policies64. 
 
3.3.2. The content of the agreement and its analysis 
 
According to this agreement, the boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone in the Mediterranean between the Republic of Turkey and the Government of 
National Accord-State of Libya begins at “Point A” (34° 16′ 13.720″N -026° 19′ 11.640″E) and 
ends at the Point B (34° 09′ 07.9″N -026° 39′ 06.3″E). The boundaries of the Continental Shelf 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone determined in Article I, paragraph 1 of this Memorandum of 
Understanding are shown on the Maritime Chart INT 308 (Data Source: BA Chart Edition 
1992), scale 1: 1 102 000 (Annex 1). The coordinates are shown in the chart at Annex 1 in its 
coordinate system. The geographical coordinates referred to in ARTICLE I of this 
Memorandum of Understanding are expressed in terms of the World Geodetic System 1984 
(WGS’84). Base points coordinates that are used to determine the equidistance line, are shown 
in Annex. 
Turkey-Libya Agreement with the EEZ, Turkey has exceeded the "Seville Map" plans set 
out by the University of Seville. As Turkey alleges, Greece and the GCA are aiming to exclude 
Turkey into the Gulf of Antalya by limiting the Turkish EEZ. This Agreement is defined by the 
Turkish side as the 2nd Treaty of Sevres. Turkey seeks to protect the TRNC and its own 
interests as a result of the GCA EEZ agreements with Egypt in 2003, Israel in 2010 and Lebanon 
in 2007, the search and extraction operations in the EEZ fields, the EastMed pipeline project, 
the EMGF projects65. 
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In the context of the framework of the Turkey-Libya Agreement, Cihat Yaycı and Cem 
Gürdeniz's "Mavi Vatan Doctrine;" Turkey signed the memorandum of understanding and 
therefore the Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement. This agreement has a historic significance for 
the consent of the Mavi Vatan borders. The notion of "Mavi Vatan66" is an expression of the 
value of the need for Turkey to defend its strategic interests at sea else. In this perspective, 
Turkey must take place and continue to be present in the Eastern Mediterranean. To this end, 
Turkey has signed a Memorandum of Understanding "Security and Military Cooperation 
Agreement" to restrict maritime control in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Government of 
National Accord. Eventually, the EEZ was named and announced in the official newspaper. 
The continental shelf and the boundaries of the EEZ have been adopted with a frontier of 29.9 
km in length. The agreement would fully alter the condition of the Mediterranean67.  
 
3.3.3. Some dissents 
 
Tensions are building up in the eastern Mediterranean, where the discovery of gas fields is 
fueling disputes between several states, including Greece and Turkey, in conflict for decades 
over the sharing of resources, water, and the Continental Shelf, airspace. 
Egypt opposes two agreements between Turkey and the U.N.-backed Libyan government 
on maritime rights in the Mediterranean and military cooperation. The maritime arrangement 
will grant Turkey entry to an economic zone around the Mediterranean, subject to the protests 
of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, which lay strategically between Turkey and Libya. Through 
signing the agreement, Libya breached the 2015 agreement negotiated by the transitional 
government of the country, which was approved by the Security Council. The arrangement 
includes the Presidency of the Council as a whole - not only the Representative of the Council 
working alone - to conclude international agreements. And they must be approved by the House 
of Representatives. The two Memorandums of Understanding with Turkey have not been 
approved by the House of Representatives68. 
Since its signing, Greece has strongly condemned the agreement, calling it a "violation of 
international maritime law and the sovereign rights of Greece and other countries. It describes 
it as "disruptive" for peace and stability in the region. As much as the Turkish statements irritate 
Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, which oppose the Turkish aims. Linked by major energy 
projects, these states denounce Ankara's hold on a promising area, fearing that the agreement 
will complicate the construction of the EastMed pipeline (Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Italy), 
intended to bring Mediterranean gas to Europe69. 
                                                           
66 Turkey's Mavi Vatan naval doctrine has appeared recently as one of the foundations of Turkish security and 
defense policy aimed at creating Turkey as a spectacular naval force in and outside the Mediterranean. Although the 
Mavi Vatan Doctrine has elevated the questions in Athens and Nicosia, where both confront it as an expression of 
what they see as a forceful expansionist Turkish foreign policy that interrupts Greek and Cypriot sovereignty, Mavi 
Vatan reflects the extent of thought-provoking strategic, ideological, but above all circumstantial, interbreeding 
between different undertones in Turkey. Moreover, its emergence as a cornerstone of Turkey's defence strategy, 
having existed in the margins for several years after its birth in 2006, is closely connected to the tenacity of Turkey's 
profound apparently never-ending rebalancing of power in Ankara. See, Evangelos Areteos, Mavi Vatan and 
Forward Defense The Sinuous Journey of a Republican and Imperial Hybridization, Analysis, Diplomatic Academy, 
University of Nicosia, 2020, p. 2.  
67 Zekiye Nazlı Kansu, op.cit, p. 66. 
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With regard to Greece, international law and in particular, the Convention of the law 
of the Sea grants the islands the ability to exercise sovereignty over their continental shelf and 
states that the continental shelf between the two countries shall be established on a median line 
basis70. Greece’s legal position about settlement of the EEZ dispute is essentially based on the 
claim that maritime delimitation between mainland Turkey and Greek islands must be done 
exclusively by adoption of the “equidistance principle” irrespective of any “special 
circumstances” that may exist. According to this view, islands have full right to exercise 
jurisdiction over their CS and coextensive EEZs as per Article 121 of UNCLOS71. 
This agreement essentially violates the territorial integrity of European Union Member 
States and at the behest of the Libyan Government, allows for military assistance from Turkey. 
This may have damaging consequences for the entire Mediterranean region and should be seen 
against the risky backdrop of Turkey's authoritarian expansion72. 
 
Does the Agreement conform to International law? 
 
 At odds with State sovereignty 
 
The concept of state sovereignty is fundamentally based on J. Jelinek's concept that the 
concept of the state consists of three essential constituent elements: its population, territory and 
political power. In other words, the State is commonly defined as a community that consists of 
a territory and a population subject to organized political power." This traditional definition has 
the merit of emphasizing the factual nature of the existence of the State, but the three elements 
set out in it are not sufficient: all local authorities other than the state, departments, regions, 
Member States of the Federal States, also combine these "constituent elements", but they lack 
what characterizes the state under international law73. 
This definition is also broadened by a fourth element, the state's ability to initiate and 
maintain international relations. An interesting question is whether the concept of sovereignty 
is prescriptive under international law. The doctrine remains in this unequal field. It is true that 
sovereignty is explicitly stated, as already mentioned above, in Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention, and then, in the Charter of the United Nations, as a concept " independence." It 
then appears that, in these conventions, the meaning of these terms is intended to protect, by 
the standards contained in these documents, a number of specific facts74. 
Sovereign States are the principal objects of contractual laws of international law. Notably, 
one of the key threats to the authority of international law is that it supposedly fails to recognize 
the autonomy of nations, intruding on the territories in which they should be able to make their 
own decisions. Through contrast with human autonomy, state sovereignty is also interpreted in 
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international law as a skill, security or control, and in addition as the power to make independent 
choices75. 
Likewise, the principle of non-interference, one of the corollaries of state sovereignty, has 
been the legal basis for the inertia and indifference of the international community. Above all, 
it has served to legitimize a minimal interpretation of other internationally enshrined rights such 
as the right of peoples to self-determination. The combination of the principle of non-
interference and the right of peoples to self-determination had given rise to a right, namely the 
"inalienable right" of every State to choose its political, economic, social and cultural system 
without any form of interference on the part of another State76. 
Thus, the State needs to have residents. Citizens are a group that exists in the state and is 
governed under state authority. The State, as a legitimate authority, has a responsibility to 
protect the society. The State must therefore have a jurisdiction, and the territory is a position 
for the government to apply the legislation to the people. Even within the region, the 
government may exercise authority, such as jurisdiction over the region with the help of red 
tape; have a competent army and the power to levy taxes. Since the conditions are recognized 
by international law, States should uphold the sovereignty of the territories owned by others. In 
addition, the State needs to have a government. The government has a responsibility to protect 
and flourish population. Otherwise, the government has the right to set down laws and 
administer the state in the interests of the people. Consequently, without the legislature, the 
state cannot be assumed to be a legal state. Last but not least the state has the potential to enter 
into ties with other nations. It means, as a foreign subject, only a sovereign state capable of 
entering into an arrangement with other States77. 
Although the line drawn as a maritime boundary upsets the territory of Crete, which is held 
by Greece, the agreement on the maritime borders between Turkey and Libya does not take into 
consideration the sovereignty of Greece. Turkey and Libya have both realized that the territory 
of Greece exists in that area; yet neither country has invited Greece to join the agreement as a 
country that also has the effect of the agreement. Thus an agreement may be considered to be 
an agreement which does not obey one of the basic and essential principles of international law, 
such as the sovereignty of the State78. 
 
 Versus the Good Faith principle 
 
As a general principle of law perched at a considerable level of abstraction, good faith, in 
the same way any other principle or general notion is used by standards to apply to concrete 
cases. When we talk about 'legitimate trust protection' or 'abuse', these concepts are not legally 
predetermined. They refer to the rationalities of a relationship as well as to the history of social 
com carriers and expectations. But in all these cases, the standard is used to help implement the 
pre-existing principle. However, there are also cases - and they are of interest to us here - where 
the term good faith is used in a synonymous non-technical sense of reasonableness. Good faith 
here has no body of its own; the term is interchangeable. It's a pure standard. Examples can be 
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found in terms of interpretation or when we talk about a bona fide link for the exercise of 
extraterritorial competence, etc.79. 
Unlike certain general principles of international law, the principle of good faith does not 
in itself; imply the benefit of any specific state of affairs. It helps to maintain the 
acknowledgement of communicative actions on behalf of international law-makers (i.e. States 
and international organizations) independent of the normative or political policy that they 
themselves are following. Thus the concept of good faith can be reconciled in a value-pluralistic 
legal order80. 
Good faith, in an empirical context, is a strong general rule, a general concept of law. This 
is by far the most critical form of good faith in international law. The content of good faith as 
a general concept decomposes itself in a variety of more specific ways. There are three major 
elements, which are presented here in order of declining significance. Second, the concept of 
good faith requires the defense of reasonable expectations that a certain course of action has 
provoked in another person, irrespective of the particular intent of the actor. Second, on the 
opposite side of the issue, good faith as a general concept defends those aims embedded in the 
popular interest against unnecessary individualistic pretensions. Third, the concept of good 
faith has coagulated in it many prohibitions of non-loyal behavior, particularly by the old 
maxim, advocated by middle-aged civilists and canonists, that no one should take full 
advantage of his own wrongs81. 
Probably the most controversial element of good faith in international law is the avoidance 
of the violation of rights. The aspect of the deprivation of rights and the unreasonable exercising 
of rights are closely linked and not easily differentiated. It is said that an infringement of rights 
happens when a State exercises its rights in such a manner as to infringe the rights of another 
State, and that the exercising of that right is "irrational and unreasonable, without proper respect 
for the reasonable standards of the other State82. 
Pacta sunt servanda is the most crucial principle of international relations established by 
treaties. Even referred to as the fundamental rule of international law by Hans Kelsen, the 
concept is promulgated in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
but also stretches beyond the commitments of the Treaty and speaks of the binding essence of 
international law in general. The value of this concept has been widely reaffirmed in theory and 
jurisprudence; it has been accepted both as customary international law and as a general 
principle of law, aside from the presumption that international conventions have a common 
legal impact on their contracting parties as they have on national legal structures. Closely 
related to the principle of good faith, pacta sunt servanda stems from the agreement granted by 
the respective parties to the Convention, giving the obligations a legitimizing effect. At the 
same time, although the pacta sunt servanda principle has an impartial standing. The principle 
ditto confronts States as an objective principle, regardless of their will. States must also comply 
with the commitments entered into as they stand, that the material must be executed in good 
faith and in the context of the equilibrium of international relations83. 
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There are variations in the understanding of the principle that determines how States apply 
the principle of good faith in the agreement. In order to minimize the number of various 
meanings of good faith, the theory of good faith is demonstrated in the Vienna Convention of 
196984. 
Accordingly, in compliance with the Vienna Convention of 1969, good faith has become a 
basic standard that must prevail in the negotiation. If the principle of good faith is not applied 
by the State in the course of forming an international agreement, it may become void. In the 
case of the Turkey-Libya deal on maritime borders, it is clarified that the two parties do not 
have strong faith in the mechanism of achieving an agreement85. 
Article 31(1) demands that any treaty be understood "in good faith" and that the basic idea 
expressed in that well-known term be defined as some sort of shield encompassing the whole 
mechanism of interpretation. This notion, expressed in the opening words of the general rule of 
interpretation, paves the way and guides the obligation as a whole. As of the most basic rule of 
law of the Treaties, a treaty must be carried out in good faith." Because the interpretation of a 
treaty is a necessary aspect of its success, rationality demands that good faith be committed to 
the interpretation of treaties. Good faith must be used throughout the interpretation process, i.e. 
when analyzing the normal sense of the text, the context, intent and intention, the relevant 
practices of the parties, etc. In addition, the outcome of the interpretative process must therefore 
be respected in good faith86. 
Article 69, on the effects of the invalidity of the Treaties, states that Actions done in good 
faith before inapplicability has been invoked shall not be illegal purely on the basis of invalidity 
of the Treaty.' This implies that if a State enters into a treaty of good faith before the deal has 
been found invalid, the parties cannot be accountable. Additionally, paragraph 2(b) explicitly 
states that the rules on invalidity in the Treaty are without prejudice to issues of liability for 
illegal act which may occur as a result of the basis of invalidity. Issues of State liability should 
not come under the framework of Article 69, which already stems from the general law of 
Article 73. Therefore, as the International Law Commission argues, "if the act in question were 
unlawful for any other reason independent of the nullity of the Treaty, that paragraph would 
not be sufficient to make it lawful." This is especially relevant for certain reasons of invalidity 
which may be focused on behavior which is in violation of international law, such as corruption, 
abuse, repression and coercion87. 
Turkey and Libya do not allow Greece to enter into an arrangement even if both parties 
recognize that the agreement will affect the territories of Greece. Turkey and Libya are 
concerned only about the gain of the groups, nor are they concerned with the effect on another 
state. In addition, all parties realize that there is an island around the line owned by Greece. It 
means that Turkey and Libya recognize that if they disregard the presence of Crete, there would 
be a dispute. Therefore, the maritime boundary deal between Turkey and Libya is not legitimate 
because they do not conform to the principle of good faith88. 
 
 Conflict with the Law of the Seas Convention 
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Considering the geographical and economic interest of the Eastern Mediterranean as well 
as its context, the demarcation of EEZs is a very controversial process that is motivated by 
competing political and legal arguments. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea postulates that a state's territorial waters expand just 12 nautical miles out to sea, although 
an exclusive economic zone – in which a country may claim fishing, mining and exploration 
rights – can extend another 200 NM. If the maritime gap between the two states is less than 424 
NM, an accepted dividing line between their EEZs must be formed. However, Turkey did not 
sign up to UNCLOS, presumably because the treaty gives substantial privileges to island 
territories, including Cyprus and Greece89. 
Turkey rather demands rights dependent on its continental shelf, a practice that significantly 
restricts the rights of its neighbors. Under customary international law, as expressed in Article 
76 of the UNCLOS, this maritime zone made up of the seabed and ground water which stretch 
to the outer edge of the continental rim. Although as mentioned above the upper limit of the 
EEZ itself is 200 NM, the continental shelf may stretch throughout 200 NM from the shore, 
based on the depth, form and geophysical conditions of the seabed and sub-sea ground. Article 
76 UNCLOS specifies that the continental shelf 'does not outweigh 350 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the width of the territorial sea is determined or does not exceed 100 NM 
from the 2500 m isobath, which is a line going the depth of 2500 m90. 
 
 Taking into account the treaty of amity and cooperation principles  
 
As the Treaty of amity and cooperation in South-East Asia (TAC) was signed in 1976 at 
the first Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting, the obsolescence of a 
nearly 10-year-old organization was already unorthodox. In the 1960s, countries in Southeast 
Asia had already associated with the Alliance of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo as post-
colonial initiatives, but ultimately failing. The creation of ASEAN in 1967 was another effort 
by non-communist states in South East Asia to create an intergovernmental body to strengthen 
regional cooperation. In this respect, the TAC was an autochthonous reaction by the Southeast 
Asian States to the uncertainties of foreign policy in the region91.At first, the Treaty applies 
exclusively to ASEAN member States. Subsequently, a modification was made in the form of 
a protocol on 15 December 1987 and the Treaty was accessible for entry by States outside 
ASEAN. The Treaty has now been ratified by 28 States, including Turkey and Greece as a 
member of the European Union92. 
The treaty is an ethical code regulating inter-state ties. Article 1 provides ʻʻThe purpose of 
this TAC is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples 
which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationshipʼʼ. Article 2 states 
ʻʻIn their relations with each other, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the 
following fundamental principles: 
 a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national identity of all nations; 
 b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion;  
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c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
f. Effective cooperation among themselvesʼʼ. 
In compliance with the purpose and values set out in the TAC, the agreement should be 
complied with by the participant States with a view to developing and improving the diplomatic 
ties, tradition and history of good neighbors, based on the principles of good faith. Through 
participating in the Treaty, States are obligated to promote and facilitate relations between the 
citizens of the State who participate in the Treaty. However in its progress from 1976 to the 
present, there are so many issues facing the agreement, particularly as regards national 
borders93. 
In the case of the Maritime Borders Agreement between Turkey and Libya, it is counter to 
the first TAC principle, namely 'mutual respect for the freedom, autonomy, dignity, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations.' Because Greece and Turkey are TAC States, all 
States must apply the principle of the Agreement. Even though Libya does not participate in 
TAC, Turkey must take into account the TAC's principles in its Maritime Boundaries 
Agreement with Libya, since all parties recognize that the agreement would influence Greece, 
which is also a State party in TAC94. 
 
 Skhirat Agreements invalidates Turkish-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding 
 
The Skhirat agreements are peace agreements on Libya. These agreements were signed on 
17 December 2015 between representatives of the General National Congress and those of the 
House of Representatives in the Moroccan city of Skhirat. 
Skhirat Agreement tried to settle the quarrel between the House of Representatives (HoR) 
and its related administration, and the Government of the General National Congress (GNC) in 
Tripoli. It formed the Presidential Council of the Government of the National Accord, a nine-
member executive which took office in Tripoli in March 2016 and was named to form the 
Government of the National Accord and the High State Advisory Council of former members 
of the GNC. The HoR was to serve as the supreme constitutional body in the country and to 
authorise the government of reconciliation95. 
The signing by Turkey and Libya of the Memorandum of Understanding on the sovereignty 
of sea areas, which Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus have announced, is a violation of the Skhirat 
Agreement because it is not the prerogative of the head of the Libyan National Accord 
government to sign international agreements on its own, but international agreements must be 
signed with the approval of the Libyan Council of ministers. 
 
4. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL COMPULSORY MEANS 
 
Whatever form of dispute occurs in a particular situation, any dispute between or between 
United Nations Member States is regulated by the Charter of the United Nations26, including 
the principles of sovereign independence of states, the prohibition of the use of force, the 
negotiated resolution of conflicts and the free choice of means. 
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The seven States in the Eastern Mediterranean are member States in the United Nations. 
All Members shall resolve their international conflicts through diplomatic means in such a way 
that international peace and security and justice are not violated.' However, In addition, all 
parties to any conflict whose continued presence is likely to jeopardize the preservation of 
international peace and security shall seek, first and foremost, the protection of international 
peace and security96. 
Many maritime border disputes entail conflicting claims to the EEZ and the continental 
shelf, while often overlapping claims to the territorial sea can also be included in a conflict. As 
far as delimitation is concerned, the UNCLOS provides as follows for the territorial waters, the 
EEZ and the continental shelf. Thus, UNCLOS deals with the EEZ and the continental shelf in 
the same direction with respect to the settlement of conflicts resulting from conflicting claims: 
for States with opposite or neighboring coasts, the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental 
shelf shall take place by consensus on the basis of international law in order to find an equitable 
and satisfactory solution97. 
If the parties to a maritime border dispute are states who are parties to UNCLOS and unable 
to find a solution through peaceful means of their own choosing, they are obliged to return to 
the obligatory dispute resolution procedures set out in Section Two of Part XV of the 
UNCLOS98.  
 
4.1.  The difficulty of asylum for the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea 
 
It was clear from the foregoing that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is an 
inescapable instrument, not only because of the rules it contains, but also because of the 
framework treaty function it assumes. Described as a true "constitution of the seas and oceans," 
the Convention aims, according to its preamble, to resolve all "problems concerning the law of 
the sea" by establishing "a legal order for the seas and oceans". The provisions relating to this 
subject are indeed dotted throughout the Convention, whether it is the rights of the coastal state 
to take measures to prevent pollution (parts II to IX), or rules relating to the exploration or 
exploitation of mineral resources of the International Seabed Zone (Part XI and 1994 
Agreement amending this part of the Convention) , or rules on marine scientific research (part 
XIII). In order to resolve any disputes that may arise from the interpretation and application of 
these provisions, the Convention also provides for a complex and innovative mechanism. The 
general idea is to ensure that the resolution of a dispute is mandatory and, at the same time, that 
the litigants have the choice of how to settle it peacefully. Part XV of the Convention thus 
details the rules on dispute resolution, and Article 287 lists the judicial proceedings to which 
the parties can or must resort, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS)99. 
In certain situations, however, ITLOS retains special compulsory authority not in conflict 
with the ICJ or with arbitration. Apart from all kinds of disputes, which seem not yet to have 
taken place, involving the discovery and extraction of the natural resources of the seabed 
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outside national jurisdiction, which fall under the binding and exclusive jurisdiction of the 11-
member Seabed Dispute Chamber, the exclusive mandatory authority of the Tribunal is 
practiced in two separate imperative processes100. 
The parties who resort to ITLOS to resolve disputes have the potential advantage of a 
"standing" judicial system that can be required in time to acquire specialist knowledge in the 
topic of the respective agreements and to create consistent and instantly recognizable 
jurisprudence in the areas protected by the agreements. This will provide practical advice and 
support to the parties in establishing future negotiations and thereby allow them to prevent or 
mitigate conflicts101. 
Unfortunately, international law on this subject is difficult to make compatible with the 
claims of any individual group and can cause a great deal of distortion on either side. However 
the law is resolved, which could offer a permanent solution for keeping stewing rivalries at bay 
and for finding a way out of the present stalemate.  
It is important to remember here that Turkey is not a party to the UNCLOS, and thus the 
UNCLOS is not actually the relevant law. At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Turkey voted against the UNCLOS in its effort to claim that islands should not have 
a continental shelf or an exclusive economic zone and that the latter can be decided only by 
reference to two mainland territories, a position that was officially opposed102. 
Nevertheless, it is well known that most of the terms of the Convention are merely a 
solidified version of customary international maritime law, which is extremely pertinent to the 
situation with Turkey. 
 
4.2.  May the International Court of justice be a solution? 
Dispute is a well-known concept in international law. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has been repeatedly brought to define it, following the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. In her view, a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict, an 
opposition of legal theses or interests between parties. The International Court of Justice has 
not validated this doctrine. In her point, the fact that a dispute has a political dimension does 
not prohibit it from being treated in law. When the Court was faced with legal issues adhesion 
in the broader context of an eminently political dispute, it never refused to rule on that ground, 
not even in the case of the use of armed force103.  
It could well be that the most important contribution rendered by the International Court of 
Justice to this issue is the disputes relating to the delimitation of maritime areas between 
opposite or neighbouring Nations. The particular instance of the Court on maritime delimitation 
has had a significant effect on the clarity of the definitions and rules of delimitation, as well as 
on the convergence of the regulations on the delimitation of all maritime areas104. 
Maritime borders occur in the form of coastal waters, adjacent zones and EEZ; they do not 
include the lake or river borders that are assumed to be surrounded by land borders. Any 
maritime borders remained indefinite amid attempts to explain them. This is explained by a 
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variety of reasons, some of which include geographical issues. Demarcation of maritime 
borders has strategic, economic and environmental consequences105.  
In the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case the Court issued its famous quote on the essence of 
maritime boundary delimitation, stressing that the delimitation of sea zones is often regulated 
by international law. The Court declared: ʻʻThe delimitation of sea areas has always an 
international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a 
unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the 
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international lawʼʼ106. 
Nevertheless, international law on the delimitation of maritime boundaries refers only to 
the demarcation of overlapping maritime areas between states107. 
With a view to reach a case decision, the ICJ must, as a preliminary step, decide both the 
matters of jurisdiction and the issues of admissibility. Jurisdiction matters 'are those which 
essentially arise from whether the Court has the authority and the ability to handle the case 
brought by the State,' while eligibility issues specify whether the case itself is a matter which 
is suitable to be determined by the Court of Justice. Consequently, jurisdictional issues must 
invoke the admissibility issues, as the admissibility issues will only be identified after the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been resolved108. 
The contentious jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should only be invoked if 
there is a legitimate conflict of a legal sort. Such a international legal dispute can be defined as 
the gap on a matter of law or fact, a conflict, a difference of legal opinions or interests. The 
legal framework may be formed in compliance with Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, 
which specifies that only States can be party to cases before the Court. Essentially, the consent 
of the parties can take a range of types, ranging from voluntary consent to agree on the grounds 
of reciprocity or time-limited consent. Whatever form the acceptance can take, it must also 
qualify as a condition for the practice of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The acceptance 
of the States Parties may be explicit or implicit and may be obtained from a variety of fields: 
(i) by special agreement; (ii) in treaties or conventions; (iii) by compulsory jurisdiction; (iv) via 
forum prorogatum; (v) by the Court’s own determination of its jurisdiction; (vi) from 
interpretation of a judgment; and (vii) from the revision of a judgment109. 
Under Article 36 para. 2, of the Statute of the Court "States parties may, at any time, declare 
that they recognize as compulsory by right and without a special agreement, with respect to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court over all legal disputes". 
Each State that has accepted the court's compulsory jurisdiction has the right to summon before 
the Court, by submitting a petition, one or more States that have accepted the same obligation 
and, conversely, undertakes to appear before the Court in case it is cited by one or more of those 
states. Statements of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction take the form of a unilateral act of 
the State and are filed with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
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However, only Egypt, Greece and Cyprus declared that they recognize as compulsory ipso 
facto the jurisdiction of the Court110. Turkey is a member of the United Nations originating but 
has not yet made the declaration recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Certain treaties or conventions conducting compromise clauses stating that disputes over 
the interpretation or application of the treaty will have to be submitted to the ICJ. In instance, 
the Court -in Aegean Sea case- is considering its jurisdiction over this dispute. In paragraph 32 
of its application, Greece specified two bases on which it states that it bases the jurisdiction of 
the Court in this case. Although paragraph 3 of Greece's brief on the question of the jurisdiction 
that these two bases was stated, they are quite distinct and will therefore be examined one after 
the other. The first basis of jurisdiction is presented in paragraph 32, sub paragraph 1, of the 
request: ʻʻArticle 17 of the General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes 
of 1928, closer to Articles 36, paragraph 1, and 37 of the Statute of the Court. On 14 September 
1931 and 26 June 1934 respectively, Greece and Turkey joined this instrument, which remains 
in force with regard to themʼʼ. According 17 of the General Act of 1928 which is part of Chapter 
II of this Act, entitled ʻʻFrom Judicial Settlementʼʼ, "All disputes with regard to which the 
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may 
be made under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, unless the parties agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral 
tribunal. It understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned 
in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice". The article 
therefore provides that, under certain conditions, disputes over which the parties challenge each 
other's rights will be brought before the now-defunct Permanent Court of International Justice. 
Article 37 of the current Statute, however, states that: ʻʻWhenever a treaty or convention in 
force provides for reference of a matter to . . . the Permanent Court of International Justice, the 
matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court 
of Justice111. 
Of course, Article 17 of the General Act of 1928, invoked in this case by Greece, contains 
a jurisdictional clause referring to the Permanent Court certain specially foreseen cases, namely 
any disputes over which the parties would challenge each other's right. It follows that, if the 
1928 Act is considered to be an existing agreement between Greece and Turkey and applicable, 
the Act, in conjunction with Articles 37 and 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, may provide a 
sufficient basis for the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. In 1948, the United Nations General 
Assembly undertook a review of the text of the General Act of 1928 with a view to restoring 
its original effectiveness, diminished in some respects by the dissolution of the League of 
Nations and the disappearance of its organs. On 28 April 1949 the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 268 A-III, under which it instructed the Secretary-General to establish the text of a 
revised General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, taking into account 
the amendments it had adopted, and to keep it open to state membership112. 
The problem in this case was that the Court was not convinced by the various reasons given 
for the difference between the reservations of territorial status of Greece contained respectively 
in its declaration under the optional provision and in its instrument of accession to the General 
Act, if the latter instrument is given the meaning attributed to it by Greece. It also seems 
significant that nothing in the documents of the time communicated to the Court concerning the 
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preparation of the declaration of acceptance of the optional provision made by Greece in 1929 
and the deposit of its instrument of accession in 1931 corroborates these explanations113. 
One of the last solutions available may be, although it is difficult at the moment to sign a 
special agreement. Where even the parties sign a special agreement to bring a legal issue before 
the Judge, the agreement can be treated as an explicit and unambiguous admission to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Usually, the parties should give such notice of a special resolution or 
written request to the Registry of the Court, stating the subject-matter of the dispute as well as 
the parties to the dispute114. This solution, as I mentioned, seems difficult in light of the strained 




 Between countries bordering the Mediterranean, the sea remains the essential factor of 
unity as their diversity in the political, economic and cultural fields is great. Faced with a 
narrow, fragile and increasingly strategically important maritime environment, the countries 
concerned are practically condemned to cooperate and to maintain the so-called ʻʻcommon 
heritageʼʼ. Many voices have been raised among the northern and southern residents to draw 
attention to the dangers inherent in the transformation of the Mediterranean into a field of 
confrontation between great powers, and to urge that it be considered an area of peace, security 
and cooperation. It is in this spirit that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted an 
annual resolution every year since 1981 on "strengthening security and cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region. 
The Greek-Egyptian agreement is seen as a response to the illegal Turkish-Libyan 
agreement signed at the end of 2019 allowing Turkey access to a large maritime area in the 
eastern Mediterranean where large hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered in recent years. 
Its ratification comes at the height of the Greek-Turkish relations crisis in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Under the treaty, Egypt and Greece are now allowed to derive the maximum 
benefits from the resources available in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including oil and 
gas reserves. This agreement, aimed at demarcating maritime areas, but always in the context 
of international law and international law of the sea. 
Implementation of the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
seems uncertain, in particular, that Turkey is not a state party. It is not easy to submit the dispute 
to the ILTOS or the ICJ, and rather to have a political review to consider whether they have 
contributed to a calming of relations between the countries under consideration. 
The issue of the power struggle in the eastern Mediterranean has become a vital issue for 
Turkey today, as it had never been before. If Turkey justifies its military intervention in Libya 
by the need to help the growing number of civilian casualties on the ground; Turkey's increased 
political clout in the region serves other strategic, political and economic interests. 
Turkey's freedom of action despite the permanent arms embargo in Libya and the 
international community's condemnation of its actions only confirm the failure of peace 
negotiations undertaken by international organizations since 2011. 
The EU is currently content with reprimands for Turkey's actions in the Mediterranean Sea, 
but the Turkish government will continue to pursue its national and regional interests in the 
region if no sanctions from a supranational authority including the UN are imposed on it. 
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